Abstract: SIMON and SPECK family ciphers have attracted the attention of cryptographers all over the world since proposed by NSA in June, 2013. At CHES 2015, Simeck, a new block cipher inspired from both SIMON and SPECK is proposed, which is more compact and efficient. However, the security evaluation on Simeck against zero correlation linear cryptanalysis seems missing from the specification. The main focus of this paper is to fill this gap and evaluate the security level on Simeck against zero correlation linear cryptanalysis. According to our study, 11/13/15 rounds zero correlation linear distinguishers on Simeck32/48/64 are proposed respectively, then zero correlation linear cryptanalysis on 20/24/27 rounds Simeck32/48/64 are firstly proposed. As far as we know, for Simeck32, our result is the best result to date.
Introduction
With the increasing need for low-end embedded devices, algorithms which have to adapt to the very constrained memory is greatly needed. SIMON and SPECK [4] are two lightweight block ciphers proposed by NSA in 2013. SIMON is designed for hardware friendly and SPECK is designed for software friendly. To meet the need of small hardware implementations, Gangqiang Yang et al. proposed Simeck at CHES 2015. Simeck benefits from both the designs of SIMON and SPECK, while it has more compact and efficient hardware implementation. At the same time, it has comparable security margin with SIMON and SPECK.
The concept of zero correlation linear cryptanalysis was firstly proposed by Andrey Bogdanov and Vincent Rijmen in [5] . In the recent two years, zero correlation linear cryptanalysis has shown its great potential in cryptanalysis and it has proven to be effective against massive ciphers. Generally speaking, this cryptanalytic method can be concluded as "use linear approximation of probability 1/2 to eliminate the wrong key candidates".
In the specification of Simeck [1] , designers evaluated the security level against massive cryptanalytic methods such as differential cryptanalysis, linear cryptanalysis, impossible differential cryptanalysis, rotational attacks and so on. However, as an important cryptanalytic tool, zero correlation linear cryptanalysis is essential to evaluate the security level for this 2 newly proposed block cipher.
Our contributions
The main purpose of this paper is to evaluate the security level on Simeck against zero correlation linear cryptanalysis.
For distinguishers, this paper proposes zero correlation linear distinguishers on all variants of Simeck. Based on "0-1" bit contradictions, 11/13/15-round zero correlation linear distinguishers on Simeck32/48/64 are firstly proposed.
To validate the usefulness of these newly proposed zero correlation linear distinguishers, this paper evaluates the security level on Simeck against zero correlation linear cryptanalysis, for Simeck32/48/64, 20/24/27 round of the cipher can be attacked respectively. The results are concluded in the This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, notations used in this paper are introduced. In section 3, a brief description on Simeck is presented. Section 4 proposes some zero correlation linear distinguishers on Simeck. Section 5 proposes zero correlation linear cryptanalysis on Simeck and section 6 concludes this paper.
Notations
Simeck 2n(4n): the block size of this Simeck version is 2n, the key size is 4n. P: a 2n-bit plaintext, consisting of two n-bit words ( , ) 
A Brief Description on Simeck
Simeck is a family of lightweight block ciphers proposed at CHES 2015, the round function of Simeck is slightly modified from SIMON and the key schedule of Simeck adopt the idea of round function reuse like SPECK does. Like SIMON, the structure of Simeck is a typical Feistel network, the operations Simeck used are simply bitwise AND, XOR and rotation operation. The only difference for the round function between Simeck and SIMON is the rotation constant, which is (0,5,1) for Simeck and (1,8,2) for SIMON. The round function of Simeck is depicted in Figure 1 below. Unlike SIMON and SPECK, there are only 3 different versions for Simeck, the parameters of each version are illustrated in the table 2 below. The initial master key K consists of four n-bit words
First, initialize vector 0 1 2 0 , , , t t t k with 3 2 1 0 , , ,
RK k = is computed with the following equation:
where ( ) ( ( 5) 
Zero Correlation Linear Distinguishers on Simeck
For ARX ciphers, zero correlation linear distinguishers are usually built with miss-in-the -middle technique and the contradiction for this kind of distinguishers is usually "0-1" contradiction. Usually, this kind of distinguishers consists of two approaches: forward approach (encryption direction) and backward approach (decryption direction).
For Simeck32, in the encryption direction, we find that for any 5-round non-zero linear hull with input linear mask of (1000000000000000 0000000000000000 ). Combining these two approaches together, we can derive an 11-round zero correlation linear distinguisher with input linear mask of (1000000000000000 0000000000000000) and output linear mask of (0000000000000000 0000010000000000). Similarly, 13-round zero correlation linear distinguisher for Simeck48 and 15-round zero correlation linear distinguisher for Simeck64 can be derived (See table 7 for more details).
The zero correlation linear distinguishers used to attack these Simeck variants are illustrated in the Output 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000001000000000000000000000000
Zero Correlation Linear Cryptanalysis on Simeck
In this section, with the proposed 11/13/15 round zero correlation linear distinguishers 5 on Simeck32/48/64, zero correlation linear cryptanalysis on 20-round Simeck32, 24-round Simeck48 and 27-round Simeck64 are firstly proposed.
Zero Correlation Linear Cryptanalysis on Simeck32
In this section, zero correlation linear cryptanalysis on 20-round Simeck32 is proposed, we use an 11-round zero correlation linear distinguisher and add five initial rounds and four final rounds before and after the distinguisher. The details are depicted in the figure 2 below: Step 1. Allocate a counter vector 
Step 4. Step 5. Step 6. The target of this step is to reduce Table6. Details of Partial encryption procedure for step 6
Step Guess Counter(size) Complexity 6.1 Step 7. The target of this step is to reduce Table7. Details of Partial encryption procedure for step 7
(2) RK
Step Guess Counter(size) Complexity 
Step 8. Allocate a new counter vector Next step is to recover the master key. Unlike SIMON, the key schedule of Simeck is nonlinear, which lead to the idea of establishing linear equations for the round key bits and then using Gaussian elimination method to derive master keys is impractical. So we introduce a novel method here to recover the master keys. Step 9. First of all, sort the 36.67 2 round key candidates ( | ) η ξ according to the value of η .
Step 10. Then, for each candidate of η , guess all the other 32 master key bits (denoted as ' η ).
After the key schedule algorithm, if a candidate ( | ') η η can make ( | ) η ξ locate in the 36.67 2 round key candidates, save ( | ') η η .
Step 11. Finally test whether a derived master key ( | ') η η is correct or not by verification for plaintext-ciphertext pairs.
Complexity estimation
The To sum up, the total time complexity is about 56.65 2 20-round Simeck32/64 encryptions.
Zero Correlation Linear Cryptanalysis on Simeck48 and Simeck64
For Simeck48 and Simeck64, similar attacks are also possible. However, to avoid redundancy, this section just uses two small tables (table 8 and table 9 ) to illustrate the counter vector, the order of the guessed key bits and complexities of each and overall procedure. Researchers could follow these details to realize the procedure of the attack. Specially, we want to note that the round key bits described in these tables have orders, to decrease the overall complexity, we adopt the strategy to guess the round key bits bit by bit (despite the first steps), those key bits in the bracket are guessed at one time.
Table8. Attack procedure on 24-round Simeck48(96)
Step (0,1,5), (0), 
Conclusion
This paper investigates the security level on Simeck against zero correlation linear cryptanalysis. For Simeck32, currently best result is proposed. During our research, we find that different rotation constants and different key schedules both have effect on the length we can attack with zero correlation linear cryptanalysis. How to choose and even category these parameters is an interesting topic. On the other hand, the security level against other cryptanalytic methods for Simeck is further to be studied.
